Socrates and Meno's slave

Socrates and Meno's slave Wed, 22 Jun 2022 09:13:48 GMT 2022-06-22T09:13:48Z Soc. They spoke of a glorious truth, as I <a name="507"></a>conceive. <a name="508"></a> Men. What was it? and who were they? <a name="509"></a> Soc. Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had <a name="510"></a>studied how they might be able to give a reason of their profession: there, <a name="511"></a>have been poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, <a name="512"></a>and many others who were inspired. And they say-mark, now, and see whether <a name="513"></a>their words are true-they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at <a name="514"></a>one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born <a name="515"></a>again, but is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live <a name="516"></a>always in perfect holiness. "For in the ninth year Persephone sends the <a name="517"></a>souls of those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient crime <a name="518"></a>back again from beneath into the light of the sun above, and these are <a name="519"></a>they who become noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are <a name="520"></a>called saintly heroes in after ages." The soul, then, as being immortal, <a name="521"></a>and having been born again many times, rand having seen all things that <a name="522"></a>exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them <a name="523"></a>all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance <a name="524"></a>all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature <a name="525"></a>is akin, and the soul has learned all things; there is no difficulty in <a name="526"></a>her eliciting or as men say learning, out of a single recollection -all <a name="527"></a>the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and <a name="528"></a>all learning is but recollection. And therefore we ought not to listen <a name="529"></a>to this sophistical argument about the impossibility of enquiry: for it <a name="530"></a>will make us idle; and is sweet only to the sluggard; but the other saying <a name="531"></a>will make us active and inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire <a name="532"></a>with you into the nature of virtue. <a name="533"></a> Men. Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that <a name="534"></a>we do not learn, and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? <a name="535"></a>Can you teach me how this is? <a name="536"></a> Soc. I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and <a name="537"></a>now you ask whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no <a name="538"></a>teaching, but only recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve <a name="539"></a>me in a contradiction. <a name="540"></a> Men. Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. <a name="541"></a>I only asked the question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what <a name="542"></a>you say is true, I wish that you would. <a name="543"></a> Soc. It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please <a name="544"></a>you to the utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous <a name="545"></a>attendants, that I may demonstrate on him. <a name="546"></a> Men. Certainly. Come hither, boy. <a name="547"></a> Soc. He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he <a name="548"></a>not? <a name="549"></a> Men. Yes, indeed; he was born in the <a name="550"></a>house. <a name="551"></a> Soc. Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe <a name="552"></a>whether he learns of me or only remembers. <a name="553"></a> Men. I will. <a name="554"></a> Soc. Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is <a name="555"></a>a square? <a name="556"></a> Boy. I do. <a name="557"></a> Soc. And you know that a square figure has these four lines <a name="558"></a>equal? <a name="559"></a> Boy. Certainly. <a name="560"></a> Soc. And these lines which I have drawn through the middle <a name="561"></a>of the square are also equal? <a name="562"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="563"></a> Soc. A square may be of any size? <a name="564"></a> Boy. Certainly. <a name="565"></a> Soc. And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the <a name="566"></a>other side be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: <a name="567"></a>if in one direction the space was of two feet, and in other direction of <a name="568"></a>one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once? <a name="569"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="570"></a> Soc. But since this side is also of two feet, there are <a name="571"></a>twice two feet? <a name="572"></a> Boy. There are. <a name="573"></a> Soc. Then the square is of twice two <a name="574"></a>feet? <a name="575"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="576"></a> Soc. And how many are twice two feet? count and tell <a name="577"></a>me. <a name="578"></a> Boy. Four, Socrates. <a name="579"></a> Soc. And might there not be another square twice as large <a name="580"></a>as this, and having like this the lines equal? <a name="581"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="582"></a> Soc. And of how many feet will that be? <a name="583"></a> Boy. Of eight feet. <a name="584"></a> Soc. And now try and tell me the length of the line which <a name="585"></a>forms the side of that double square: this is two feet-what will that <a name="586"></a>be? <a name="587"></a> Boy. Clearly, Socrates, it will be double. <a name="588"></a> Soc. Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy <a name="589"></a>anything, but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows <a name="590"></a>how long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square <a name="591"></a>feet; does he not? <a name="592"></a> Men. Yes. <a name="593"></a> Soc. And does he really know? <a name="594"></a> Men. Certainly not. <a name="595"></a> Soc. He only guesses that because the square is double, <a name="596"></a>the line is double. <a name="597"></a> Men. True. <a name="598"></a> Soc. Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. <a name="599"></a>(To the Boy.) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from <a name="600"></a>a double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a figure <a name="601"></a>equal every way, and twice the size of this-that is to say of eight feet; <a name="602"></a>and I want to know whether you still say that a double square comes from <a name="603"></a>double line? <a name="604"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="605"></a> Soc. But does not this line become doubled if we add another <a name="606"></a>such line here? <a name="607"></a> Boy. Certainly. <a name="608"></a> Soc. And four such lines will make a space containing eight <a name="609"></a>feet? <a name="610"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="611"></a> Soc. Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that <a name="612"></a>this is the figure of eight feet? <a name="613"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="614"></a> Soc. And are there not these four divisions in the figure, <a name="615"></a>each of which is equal to the figure of four feet? <a name="616"></a> Boy. True. <a name="617"></a> Soc. And is not that four times four? <a name="618"></a> Boy. Certainly. <a name="619"></a> Soc. And four times is not double? <a name="620"></a> Boy. No, indeed. <a name="621"></a> Soc. But how much? <a name="622"></a> Boy. Four times as much. <a name="623"></a> Soc. Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, <a name="624"></a>not twice, but four times as much. <a name="625"></a> Boy. True. <a name="626"></a> Soc. Four times four are sixteen-are they <a name="627"></a>not? <a name="628"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="629"></a> Soc. What line would give you a space of right feet, as <a name="630"></a>this gives one of sixteen feet;-do you see? <a name="631"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="632"></a> Soc. And the space of four feet is made from this half <a name="633"></a>line? <a name="634"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="635"></a> Soc. Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size <a name="636"></a>of this, and half the size of the other? <a name="637"></a> Boy. Certainly. <a name="638"></a> Soc. Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater <a name="639"></a>than this one, and less than that one? <a name="640"></a> Boy. Yes; I think so. <a name="641"></a> Soc. Very good; I like to hear you say what you think. And <a name="642"></a>now tell me, is not this a line of two feet and that of <a name="643"></a>four? <a name="644"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="645"></a> Soc. Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought <a name="646"></a>to be more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four <a name="647"></a>feet? <a name="648"></a> Boy. It ought. <a name="649"></a> Soc. Try and see if you can tell me how much it will <a name="650"></a>be. <a name="651"></a> Boy. Three feet. <a name="652"></a> Soc. Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will <a name="653"></a>be the line of three. Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, <a name="654"></a>here are two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which <a name="655"></a>you speak? <a name="656"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="657"></a> Soc. But if there are three feet this way and three feet <a name="658"></a>that way, the whole space will be three times three <a name="659"></a>feet? <a name="660"></a> Boy. That is evident. <a name="661"></a> Soc. And how much are three times three <a name="662"></a>feet? <a name="663"></a> Boy. Nine. <a name="664"></a> Soc. And how much is the double of four? <a name="665"></a> Boy. Eight. <a name="666"></a> Soc. Then the figure of eight is not made out of a of <a name="667"></a>three? <a name="668"></a> Boy. No. <a name="669"></a> Soc. But from what line?-tell me exactly; and if you would <a name="670"></a>rather not reckon, try and show me the line. <a name="671"></a> Boy. Indeed, Socrates, I do not know. <a name="672"></a> Soc. Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his <a name="673"></a>power of recollection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now, <a name="674"></a>what is the side of a figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he <a name="675"></a>knew, and answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now <a name="676"></a>he has a difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he <a name="677"></a>knows. <a name="678"></a> Men. True. <a name="679"></a> Soc. Is he not better off in knowing his <a name="680"></a>ignorance? <a name="681"></a> Men. I think that he is. <a name="682"></a> Soc. If we have made him doubt, and given him the "torpedo's <a name="683"></a>shock," have we done him any harm? <a name="684"></a> Men. I think not. <a name="685"></a> Soc. We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some <a name="686"></a>degree to the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy his <a name="687"></a>ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all the world again <a name="688"></a>and again that the double space should have a double <a name="689"></a>side. <a name="690"></a> Men. True. <a name="691"></a> Soc. But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired <a name="692"></a>into or learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant <a name="693"></a>of it, until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not <a name="694"></a>know, and had desired to know? <a name="695"></a> Men. I think not, Socrates. <a name="696"></a> Soc. Then he was the better for the torpedo's <a name="697"></a>touch? <a name="698"></a> Men. I think so. <a name="699"></a> Soc. Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask <a name="700"></a>him, and not teach him, and he shall share the enquiry with me: and do <a name="701"></a>you watch and see if you find me telling or explaining anything to him, <a name="702"></a>instead of eliciting his opinion. Tell me, boy, is not this a square of <a name="703"></a>four feet which I have drawn? <a name="704"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="705"></a> Soc. And now I add another square equal to the former <a name="706"></a>one? <a name="707"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="708"></a> Soc. And a third, which is equal to either of <a name="709"></a>them? <a name="710"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="711"></a> Soc. Suppose that we fill up the vacant <a name="712"></a>corner? <a name="713"></a> Boy. Very good. <a name="714"></a> Soc. Here, then, there are four equal <a name="715"></a>spaces? <a name="716"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="717"></a> Soc. And how many times larger is this space than this <a name="718"></a>other? <a name="719"></a> Boy. Four times. <a name="720"></a> Soc. But it ought to have been twice only, as you will <a name="721"></a>remember. <a name="722"></a> Boy. True. <a name="723"></a> Soc. And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, <a name="724"></a>bisect each of these spaces? <a name="725"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="726"></a> Soc. And are there not here four equal lines which contain <a name="727"></a>this space? <a name="728"></a> Boy. There are. <a name="729"></a> Soc. Look and see how much this space <a name="730"></a>is. <a name="731"></a> Boy. I do not understand. <a name="732"></a> Soc. Has not each interior line cut off half of the four <a name="733"></a>spaces? <a name="734"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="735"></a> Soc. And how many spaces are there in this <a name="736"></a>section? <a name="737"></a> Boy. Four. <a name="738"></a> Soc. And how many in this? <a name="739"></a> Boy. Two. <a name="740"></a> Soc. And four is how many times two? <a name="741"></a> Boy. Twice. <a name="742"></a> Soc. And this space is of how many feet? <a name="743"></a> Boy. Of eight feet. <a name="744"></a> Soc. And from what line do you get this <a name="745"></a>figure? <a name="746"></a> Boy. From this. <a name="747"></a> Soc. That is, from the line which extends from corner to <a name="748"></a>corner of the figure of four feet? <a name="749"></a> Boy. Yes. <a name="750"></a> Soc. And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal. <a name="751"></a>And if this is the proper name, then you, Meno's slave, are prepared to <a name="752"></a>affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal? <a name="753"></a> Boy. Certainly, Socrates. <a name="754"></a> Soc. What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all these answers <a name="755"></a>given out of his own head? <a name="756"></a> Men. Yes, they were all his own. <a name="757"></a> Soc. And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not <a name="758"></a>know? <a name="759"></a> Men. True. <a name="760"></a> Soc. But still he had in him those notions of his-had he <a name="761"></a>not? <a name="762"></a> Men. Yes. <a name="763"></a> Soc. Then he who does not know may still have true notions <a name="764"></a>of that which he does not know? <a name="765"></a> Men. He has. <a name="766"></a> Soc. And at present these notions have just been stirred <a name="767"></a>up in him, as in a dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions, <a name="768"></a>in different forms, he would know as well as any one at <a name="769"></a>last? <a name="770"></a> Men. I dare say. <a name="771"></a> Soc. Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge <a name="772"></a>for himself, if he is only asked questions? <a name="773"></a> Men. Yes. <a name="774"></a> Soc. And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is <a name="775"></a>recollection? <a name="776"></a> Men. True. <a name="777"></a> Soc. And this knowledge which he now has must he not either <a name="778"></a>have acquired or always possessed? <a name="779"></a> Men. Yes. <a name="780"></a> Soc. But if he always possessed this knowledge he would <a name="781"></a>always have known; or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have <a name="782"></a>acquired it in this life, unless he has been taught geometry; for he may <a name="783"></a>be made to do the same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge. <a name="784"></a>Now, has any one ever taught him all this? You must know about him, if, <a name="785"></a>as you say, he was born and bred in your house. <a name="786"></a> Men. And I am certain that no one ever did teach <a name="787"></a>him. <a name="788"></a> Soc. And yet he has the knowledge? <a name="789"></a> Men. The fact, Socrates, is undeniable. <a name="790"></a> Soc. But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, <a name="791"></a>then he must have had and learned it at some other time? <a name="792"></a> Men. Clearly he must. Info